SUBJECT: Task Force 1-11 Combat After Action Report

21 July 1971

 
 

(Operation Montana Mustang) (U)

 
     
 

8.   (C)   MISSION:  The mission varied during the operation:

 
     
 

      a. TF 1-11 conducts reconnaissance in force, rocket suppression, and night ambush operations in AO WHITE; secures FSB ANNE witha company size element.

 
     
 

      b. Increases intelligence effort, reonnaissance, and surveillance of known and suspected enemy base areas.

 
     
 

      c. Conducts civil affairs/civic action activities in Hai Lang District.

 
     
 

     d. Strengthening FSBís and strong points to include repositioning of supplies and equipment.

 
     
 

     e. Assume Bde reserve commencing 15 May 1971, be prepared to command and control a reaction force anywhere in the Bde TAOR on one hour notice.

 
     
       f. Conducts quarterly training from 15 May 1971 through 16 June 1971.  
     
 

     g. Maintains Bald Eagle/Sparrow Hawk mission.

 
     
 

     h. Conducts rice denial operations in AO BLUE in conjunction with Regional Forces from Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts and establishes liaison teams.

 
     
 

9.   (C)   INTELLIGENCE:  Enemy Situation:

 
     
 

During the reported period small unit contacts were made in AO WHITE with unidentified elements of main force units of the 7th Front. The enemy continued to conduct attacks by fire on elements of TF 1-11. Overall it appeared the enemy units were avoiding contact with our friendly offensive operations. It seemed the main efforts of the enemy were concentrated on the collection of rice, intelligence and resupplying of his forces for infiltration into the lowlands during the upcoming Summer Compaign.  During this period the enemy continued to make extensive use of booby traps, inflicting maximum casualties on our forces while not having to expose himself. On numerous occasions NDPís and RONís that were used by our forces were extensively booby trapped by the time the next unit occupied the position. Sensor activity was medium to heavy in the central Northern portion of the AO, but when offensive operations were launched in response to the sensor activations there were seldom any sightings or contacts.

 
     
     
     
     
 

4

 
 

[Webmaster: TF 1-11 page 5]