Operation Montana Mustang |
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Dates of Operation: 8 April 1971 - 11 July 1971 |
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Brief Excerpt from Montana Mustang After Action Report |
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(For the entire text please contact webmaster) |
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SUBJECT: COMBAT OPERATION AFTER ACTION REPORT MONTANA MUSTANG - 080001H April 71 to 111200H Jul 71 (RCS: MAC J3-32(R2)). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Name and type of operation: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
a. Name: Montana Mustang | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
b. Type: Search and clear, reaction/exploitation, pacification, and Vietnamization. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Dates of Operation: 080001H April 1971 through 111200H July 1971. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Location: Hai Lang, Cam Lo, Gio Linh, Trieu Phong, Mai Linh, Huong Hon Districts, Quang Tri Province, RVN. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Weather: Montana Mustang was conducted during the Southwest Monsoon Season. Air operations were affected by winds and thunderstorms during the late afternoon and early evening in the mountain regions. Cloud cover hampered aerial reconnaissance in this same area. Above normal rainfall in early June also affected aerial operations. Throughout the operation, temperatures remained near normal. |
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Intelligence: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
a. Information available prior to the operation: Throughout the Brigade TAOI, enemy tactics have been characterized by attacks by fire against fixed installations and friendly units on operations, small unit contacts with occasional attacks by large forces, employment of numerous mines and boobytraps, acts of terrorism, propaganda, proselyting [sic] and food gathering in the villages. Numerous bunker complexes and base areas have been found throughout the area with larger complexes being found in the DMZ area and former Base Area 101. The enemy is capable of attacking friendly installations in Northern Quang Tri Province with up to three infantry regiments supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery regiments; and/or attacking Quang Tri City or other area in Southern Quang Tri Province from the south with up to four infantry battalions supported by one sapper battalion and one rocket/artillery battalion. However, the enemy will probably continue to use attacks by fire and economy of force operations continuing its present level of activity in the outlying areas of the Brigade TAOI and contiguous areas, allowing increased activities in the lowlands and populated areas with the objective of disrupting GVN pacification program. The enemy could possibly launch periodic offenses of limited scope and duration. The enemy has the capability of reinforcing its units in Quang Tri Province with two or three divisions from North Vietnam either across the DMZ or by way of the Laotian Panhandle. Massed enemy forces remain vulnerable to detection and destruction by tactical air, ARA, B-52 strikes, and artillery. Their base camps and bunker complexes are continuously being discovered and destroyed by Allied Forces and air reconnaissance. Infiltration routes (See Overlay, Inclosure 3) used by the enemy forces continue to be detected and interdicted by artillery, aerial bombardment, and allied ground operations. Enemy morale is vulnerable to psychological operations, especially after the unit has been in the area for an extended period of time or has suffered defeats in battle. |
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b. Information available during the operation: Valuable intelligence data resulting from numerous contacts, prisoners-of-war, and captured equipment and documents provided the operation with up-to-date intelligence factors. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Terrain: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(1) In the northwestern portion of the Brigade AO the trafficability during both wet and dry seasons is fair for foot troops, fair-to- poor for tracked vehicles, and unsuited for for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy dense undergrowth forest with some settled areas and rice paddies. Sandstone and shale constitute the soil, and rolling hills characterize the topography. |
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(2) Trafficability in the north-central portion during the wet and dry seasons is fair-to-good for foot troops, fair-to-good for tracked vehicles, and unsuited for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of single canopy, light undergrowth and brushwood. The topography is predominately flat with occasional hills. The soil consists of sandstone and basalt rock. |
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(3) During the wet seasons, trafficability in the northeast portion of the area of operation is fair-to-good for foot troops fair for tracked vehicles and poor-to-fair for wheeled vehicles. Rice paddies, dunegrass, and open areas comprise the flat area of sandy soil. |
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(4) Trafficability in the southwestern portion during the wet and dry seasons is unsuitable-to-poor (except along the Quang Tri River Valley where it is fair) for foot troops and tracked vehicles, and entirely unsuitable for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy, dense undergrowth forest and brushwood with a few rice paddies and open areas adjacent to the river. The area is very mountainous with broad flat areas in the valley. The soil consists of sandstone and shale. |
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(5) In the south-central portion, trafficability during the wet and dry seasons is unsuitable-to-poor south of the Quang Tri River and fair north of the river for foot troops and tracked vehicles, and entirely unsuitable for wheeled vehicles. Vegetation consists of multi-canopy dense undergrowth forest and brushwood. Topography north of the river consists of rolling hills while south of the river the area is mountainous. The soil consists of sandstone and shale. |
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(6) During the wet and dry seasons trafficability in the southwestern portion of the area of operation is fair-to-good for foot troops, fair for tracked vehicles, and fair-to-poor for wheeled vehicles. Rice paddies, dense grass, and open areas constitute the vegetation of this flat area of sandy soil. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Mission: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted unilateral and combined operation with RVNAF and Province Forces in assigned AO’s to detect and destroy enemy forces, LOC’s and base areas in Western Quang Tri Province and along the DMZ; assist pacification and Vietnamization in Quang Tri Province, prevent enemy forces from reestablishing former Base Area 101; and conduct reaction/exploitation operations in Western Quang Tri Province. |
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Concept of Operation: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted operations with TF 1-61 in AO Orange, TF 1-11 in AO White, TF 3-5 in AO Green, TF 1-77 initially in Mai Loc District, and D/3-5 Air Cav in the Recon Zone to locate and destroy enemy forces, eliminate VCI, conduct reaction/exploitation operations and assist in pacification and Vietnamization in Quang Tri Province. Additional AO’s were granted for special missions such as AO Blue were TF 3-5 in conjunction with RF/PF units, conducted rice denial operations. During the operation units continued to conduct Quarterly Refresher Training. This necessitated changes in control of AO’s. Near the end of the operation the Brigade began a phased withdrawal from AO Orange relinquishing control to ARVN Forces. |
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Execution: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
a. In AO Orange TF 1-61 provided security for FSB's C-2 and A-4, while continuing the conduct reconnaissance operations alon the southern boundary of the DMZ. Elements from each of the other Task Forces were frequently placed under operational control of TF 1-61. In addition the battalion was tasked with the responsibility of supporting ARVN Forces trhough blocking positions and supporting fires. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
b. TF 1-11 conducted search and clear, reconnaissance, and rocket suppression operations in AO White. The Battalion CP located at FSB Anne was secured by one rifle company. Throughout the operation the battalion retained the Bald Eagle/Sparrow Hawk mission. During part of the period of rice harvest, TF 1-11 was assigned responsibility for AO Blue where, in conjunction with RF/PF units from Mai Linh and Hai Lang Districts, it conducted rice denial operations. |
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c. During the early part of the reporting period TF 1-77 conducted search and clear operations in AO Green employing cavalry, tank, and infantry units. On 3 May 1971. the battalion set up a CP at Mai Loc and conducted operations in the AO with emphasis placed on combined operations with the Huong Hoa Regional Forces Group. |
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d. TF 3-5 on 8 April 71, began search and clear/screening operations in AO Green and along the Thach Han River east of YD263440. On 28 April the Squadron relinquished responsibility for AO Green to TF 1-77 Armor and begun conducting Quarterly Refresher Training. In mid-May the Squadron moved its CP to south of Quang Tri City where it conducted rice denial operations in AO Blue and rocket suppression operations in AO White with the aid of one rifle company. On 24 June TF 3-5 (redesignated TF Osborn) moved to YD085598 where it supported ARVN Forces in operations around FSB Fuller (See Task Force Organizatio "Springboard Bravo", Inclosure 1). After this operation, the Squadron moved its CP back to DHCB and continued to conduct operations in AO Green. |
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Problem Area: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Recommendation for RVN awards were not processed by the 1st ARVN Division in a timely manner thus causing the recommended individuals to depart this command without knowledge of the status of their award. As of the end of this operation, no action has been taken by the 1st ARVN Division to process at least 75% of the recommendations for RVN awards submitted by this headquarters for Operation Lam Son 719. Telephone calls and staff visits were made to the advisors and the 1st ARVN Division AG to resolve this problem. Very little success was achieved. |
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Commander’s Analysis: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
a. “Operation Montana Mustang” though not intended to be a major operation such as the preceding one Lam Son 719 proved to be very critical because of the period of time in which it occurred. The following significant events contributed to making “MONTANA Mustang” a noteworthy operation: (1) “Operation Lam Son 719” had just been completed. The duration and magnitude of this operation had placed great demands on both men and equipment. The operation which was to follow had to be one in which the primary mission of guarding the southern boundary of the DMZ could still be accomplished and at the same time recover to a high state of combat readiness. (2) Enemy activity began to increase rapidly around the ARVN held FSB Fuller near the end of May and early June. Eventually the FSB was overrun on 24 June ’71. (3) The rice harvest during the period mid-May thru late June is a yearly attraction for VC/NVA to obtain food supply. However, there were only minor VC/NVA taxation reported in the lowlands. (4) The NVA increased the frequency and volume of rocket and mortar attacks on FSB’s along the DMZ. (5) The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) began a phased withdrawal near the end of the operation from its sector along the DMZ and subsequent turnover of Fire Support Bases to ARVN Forces. b. All of the above mentioned events emphasized the need for close cooperation and coordination between US and GVN Forces. In the case of the attack on FSB Fuller and high probability of attacks on Cam Lo, Mai Loc and Camp Carroll, counter-attack plans or these contingencies. The counter-attack plan Spring Board Bravo for assisting ARVN in the defense of FSB Fuller was the only plan that was executed to increase FSB security, improved bunker construction was initiated in order to provide greater protection from attacks by-fire. Aditionally [sic] the barriers at all FSB’s were upgraded to reduce the possibility of Sapper attacks. |
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FOR THE COMMANDER: | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
-- End of Excerpted Text -- |
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Inclosure 7 (Significant Events) to Combat After Action Report - Montana Mustang |
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A/1-11 references indicated with * |
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